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A.DMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE AS TO TESTIMONY GIVEN AT A FORMER
TRIAL TO SHOW THAT SUCH TESTIMONY WAS INCONSISTENT
WITH THAT GIVEN AT A SECOND TRIAL.
In a recent New York case the Court held that a witness who
'vas present at the former trial, and heard the testimony and
-emembered the substance of it was a competent witness to show
that such testimony at the former trial was inconsistent with that
given at the second trial. Mc Rorie v. Monroe, 203 N. Y., 426.
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It appeared that at the trial of the case it became very important
for the defendant to show that the plaintiff's testimony varied
from the testimony given by him at a former trial of the case,
and to show this inconsistency he introduced a witness who was
present at the former trial, and .heard the testimony which the
plaintiff gave and remembered it.
It is a well established rule of evidence that declarations under
oath are admissible at a subsequent trial if the person against
whom the evidence is to be used has had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness when the testimony was taken, and the ques-
tion in issue is the same as in the proceeding in which the testi-
mony was taken, in the following cases: Where the witness who
testified is dead; or physically or mentally incapable of being
present at the trial; or has been kept away from the trial by the
adverse party; or, in civil cases, is out of the jurisdiction of the
Court, or cannot be found. Stezens Digest, Art. 32 and note.
In this class of cases the manner of proof of the previous testi-
mony is not governed by any well defined rule which is applicable
in all cases. If the testimony has been written down by a sten-
ographer, or other person, such statements form the bases of
proof. If the testimony has not been written down, the evidence
of any one who heard it and remembered it is sufficient. Steward
v. Bank, 43 Mich., 257.
There has been some conflict in the cases in England as well as
in the United States as to the exactness required of the witness in
repeating the testimony. One line of cases holds that the
witness must repeat the testimony with literal exactness, the other
and more liberal view, that it is sufficient if the witness can state
the whole substance of the former testimony. It is the generally
accepted rule that it is not necessary that the precise language of
the former testimony should be repeated. This would naturally
follow from the rule allowing a person who heard the testimony to
be a witness, for it would be impossible for such a person to give
the exact language. Wagers v. Dickey, 17 Ohio, 439.
This class of cases should be distinguished from the principal
case, for in the one case the witness is before the Court, and in the
other he is not within its jurisdiction. The purpose for which
the testimony of the witness was admitted in the principal case
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was to show that the plaintiff's testimony at the former trial was
inconsistent with that given at the first trial, and therefore he
was capable of making errors in his testimony, which affects his
capacity to testify. In other words both statements cannot be
correct, and therefore he shows a capacity to err. It is the
repugnancy of the two statements that is fatal. The question
which is before the Court is what is the proper method of showing
this inconsistency?
Statements made at a former trial are matter of record and it
is a general rule that the minutes of testimony of the witness taken
at a former trial, when properly proved may be read in evidence
to impeach the same witness on a second trial. Smith v. State, 28
Ga., 19. The most natural method is to place the two contra-
dictory statements side by side, and as both cannot be correct one
of the statements must have been spoken erroneously. It is often-
times hard to attribute this error to any specific fault. It has
often been said that a prior Self Contradiction, "shows a defect
either in memory or in honesty" of the witness.
Another way of proving testimony given at a former trial is by
witnesses who were present and heard the testimony given. This
testimony may be in the form of a stenographic report, memoran-
dum, or notes, or may be given by a witness who heard the testi-
mony given and remembered it.
In the case of Olds v. Powell, IO Ala., 393, a witness called to
impeach another witness, swore that on a former trial the witness
had sworn differently. On cross examination he admitted he
had taken a memorandum of what the witness had testified on the
former trial, which was correct as far as it went. The Court
held that the memorandum might be looked at by the witness
himself for the purpose of refreshing his memory of the facts,
but that it was not an instrument of evidence and therefore
improper to go to the jury. In Pound v. Georgia, 43 Ga., 89,
the counsel for the plaintiffs offered in evidence testimony in
writing of a witness taken down by a person who was present at
the former trial. The Court held that such testimony when
properly proven could be offered in evidence to discredit the wit-
ness' testimony in whole or in part.
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Where a witness was present at the taking of a deposition of
a party to the record, such witness may be permitted to testify
to the admissions and declarations made by such party, notwith-
standing the fact that the declarations and admissions were reduced
to writing, and embodied in a deposition. Deitz v. Regnier, 27 Kan-
sas, 94. In the case of Pearce v. Farr, 10 Miss., 54, the Court
held that where a witness has testified to facts, in a case of assault
and battery before a justice of the peace, and the witness testifies
again at a subsequent trial, it is competent to introduce the justice
of the peace before whom the first trial was had, to prove what
the witness swore to, in order to impeach his testimony. In the
case of State v. Mc Donald, 65 Me., 466, the Court held that a
witness may be impeached by showing that he testified differ-
ently at a former trial, and his testimony may be proved by anyone
who heard and recalled it. There is no rule of law which makes
the stenographic report the only competent evidence in such a
case.
The foregoing decisions seem to establish that the record fur-
nishes the strongest evidence of what a witness testified at a for-
mer trial, but it is not the only evidence admissible to impeach
his testimony. Testimony taken by counsel or his stenographer
may be offered in evidence when properly proven. Former testi-
mony may be proven by witnesses who were present and heard
the testimony given. In such cases notes taken by them may be
used to refresh their memory by reference to them, although
they are not proper evidence for the jury. If the witness is able
to repeat the substance of the testimony at a prior trial, he is a
competent witness, to show that such testimony was inconsistent
with that given at a second trial.
WAIVER OF STATUTORY QUALIFICATIONS OF JUROR IN CAPITAL CASES.
The Court of Appeals of New York held, a few months ago,
in People v. Cosmos, 98 N. E., 408, that the defendant even in a
capital case might be deemed to have waived the fact that one of
the jurors did not possess the statutory qualifications of a juror.
In this case Cosmos was found guilty of first degree murder,
"upon evidence which amply supports the verdict." After the
imposition of sentence, counsel for defense moved to set aside
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the verdict, on the ground that one juror was disqualified because
he did not possess the property qualifications necessary for a
juror under Art. I6, Sec. 502, of the Judiciary Law of New York,
It appears that in this case the juror told the sheriff who served.
notice on him that he was not qualified, but he was accepted by
both sides without challenge and his disqualification did not appear
until after the verdict. The Court, while admitting, as is
undoubtedly the well settled rule, that in absence of a statute the
defendant's express consent to a trial by less than.twelve jurors
is void, held that as to a mere technical objection, which it does
not appear prejudiced the defendant in the least, there can
be no new trial; if a challenge is not interposed the defendant
must be deemed to have waived the objection which might have
been taken.
The argument in favor of the rule in the principal case was
chiefly on the ground of convenience and necessity; any other.
holding, it is said, "would be no less intolerable than impractical,"
and would "place a premium upon the neglect to ascertain whether
a juror is qualified." While in these days the demand is unques-
tionably for simplification in criminal trials, and fewer appeals
and objections as to mere technical details, yet in a question of
life, rules founded on mere "convenience" should never be allowed
to prejudice the strict rights of a defendant.
On this point the authorities are by no means agreed, and this
is recognized in the principal case. In Thompson on Trials,
Vol. I, Sec. ii6, it is said that " the mass of American authority,
grounded upon considerations of convenience and public policy,
is opposed to the strict rule"-the principal case representing the
liberal rule. In looking up the authorities it will be found, how-
ever, that there is quite a strong dissent, and that many of the
cases cited as supporting the liberal rule do not support the prin-
cipal case.
In the principal case it is said that Indiana supports the liberal
rule, citing only Croy v. State, 32 Ind., 389. That was a case
merely of malicious trespass, and a new trial was refused merely
because one juror was not a "householder" as required by statute.
This case was decided in 1869. But in Block v. State, Ioo Ind.,
351, decided in 1884, a murder case, the Court field directly con-
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trary to the principal case, saying, "It may be that the objection
to Qrayson's want of qualification to sit as a juror in this case
worked no actual injllry tq tb appellant, but however that Inay
bive been we pannnt gffor4 to make the precedent which would
W establisbed by Por holding that Grayson was a competent
jriror." The principal case also relies- on People v. Saliford,
4 Calif., n. This was a case of murder, and a nexy trial was
not Aliowyd becase of inconipetency of a juror, but it was dis-
tinctly said iTn this case it was sp held because defnd4nt "took
hijs tj , bpfore him With a knowledge of the fact" whiph nqdle
him jncompeteat. This is enough to di~ingI4j~h it from the
prinpipal case and ppt it within the strict ruile.
fqssachusetts is considered a holding the strict role, relying
op Wz assu m v. Feejzey, I2T Mass., 93 (1876), a case of mere tort.
This case was cited with approval and said to be "in accprdancf
with the gr~at weight of American authority" in .Kohl v. Leh!-
back, 16o U. S., 293, ,oi-a Case of murder strongly supporting
the principal ese. !ut lter, in Rpgit v. Carpenter, 187 U. S.,
I.Q1 (I0,), a will P se, it was said to be in the disctgion of the
trial judge.
Th@ English authorities now support the liberal rule, 4i1though
one ple ase, i Wiils'§ Rep. 484, q vprdict for damages was set
4side b@cause of Oisqualification of j-!or. The leadilpg cases,
Hill ,: Yqte,s, I2 Fast, 22 , and In re the Chelsea Waterworks
Co., Ip .xcheq., 7AO, were both civil cases, however.
Capital casps which support the principal case are rare. Stq,
v.. B igpr, '4 T-;a. Ani., 465 (1859) merply says a verdict cures
the dftt, In (jostf3 F. Stote, '9 Ga., 6 4 (1..) the pinion
says, "fIt i§s wll settled in Georgia that all objeptipns nmust be
made before swearing in of the jury." But in a later civil case,
Georgia 1 . 1, 7,. (o7*, 73 Ga., 713 (0884) it was said; "'Althoqgh
tbh verdict rmay hbAe bgen a proper pne under the eyideqce, yet
if if was rendered by a jury of which two members were incprm-
petent to act, it was no lawful verdict and properly set asidp."
Statg v. Jackson, 27 Kan., 581, seems to support the principal
case directly. Verdict of first degree murder was refused to be
set aside because two of the jurors might .have been challenged,
but Court said. "There is no provision whatever of either the
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Constitution or the statutes that in terms makes' such persons
incompetent to serve as jurors," while there was in the principal
case. Hite's Case, 96 Va., 489 (1898), was decided on a statute
which expressly forbade exceptions to jurors after they were
sworn because of legal disabilities. State v. Patrick, 3 Jones L.
(N. C.), 443, was a case of murder by a slave. A new trial was
not granted, but the thing held waived by the defendant was a
mere "privilege" and not a statutory disqualification as in prin-
cipal case.
The leading case laying down the strict rule contra to the prin-
cipal case is an old Maryland case, decided in 1792. Shane v.
Clarke, 3 Harris & McH., 1ol. This was a case of assault and
battery, and the entire opinion is, "a non-juror is totally incapaci-
tated to serve on a jury: let there be a new trial." Quinn v. Hal-
bert, 52 Vt. 353 (188o) in applying the strict rule, gives strong
reasons for it-"The defendant by the Constitution had the right
to a trial by jury which means a legal jury, or a jury of those who
could lawfully be called to act in that capacity. Defendant not
being made aware of the disqualification until after the trial was
closed, did not waive it." They say justly that it would be dif-
ferent if he had "knowingly submitted" to this juror. Eastman v.
Wright, 4 Ohio St., 156, laid down the strict rule, properly limit-
ing it to cases where the defendant was not negligent. Again in
Watts v. Ruth, 30 Ohio St., 32 (1876). Territory v. Abeita,
i N. Mex., 545 (1873), while denying new trial in this case, says
it would be otherwise if "it appeared that the grounds of objection
were previously unknown to him" (the defendant). A Maine
case, Lane v. Goodwin, 47 Me., 593, granted a new trial under
like conditions, saying, "These facts have been repeatedly held
sufficient to authorize .the setting aside of a verdict and ordering
a new trial."
The reasons on which the strict rule is based seem to be pre-
sented most strongly in Hill v. People, 16 Mich., 351. A new
trial was granted here in a capital case, contra to the principal case.
The Court argues: "The law does not recognize him (an alien)
as a juror at all, and in legal contemplation the case is to be
treated as if he had never been placed upon the jury; if not still
worse as an outsider who bad no right to participate in their delib-
erations and may have had an improper influence on the verdict.
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It is the duty of the Court to see that the constitutional rights of
a defendant in a criminal case shall not be violated, however neg-
ligent he may be in raising the objection." They say here-and
it is answered in none of the opinions favoring the liberal rule-
that it is the duty of the State to furnish a legal tribunal, and this
means qualified jurors. In 1873 Judge Cooley supported the
case strongly, while limiting the rule to cases of felony, and refus-
ing to apply it in a civil case. Johr v. People, 26 Mich., 427
(1873).
The case of Guykowski v. People, 2 Ill., 476, while being prac-
tically overruled in the later case of Chase v. People, 40 Ill., 352,
contains reasons for the strict rule which the later case did not
attempt to answer. It is said in this case: "Accused in capital
case stands on all his rights, and waives nothing that is irregular."
A juror "cannot be rendered competent to serve by the presumed
assent of the accused because the law has not admitted him to act
in such capacity. It may also be fairly presumed that it is incum-
bent on the prosecution to take care that the jurors were compe-
tent and legally qualified. The verdict is a nullity, not having
been obtained as the law required." The Indiana Court in Rice
v. State, 16 Ind., 298, takes the same view. "An accused person
has a right to presume that the jurors called to try him are com-
petent, and he need not anticipate possible objections unless he
has notice that they exist or some reason to suppose that they
exist. He is guilty of no negligence in relying upon the state-
ments of the juror and trusting to the state to put him on trial
before an impartial and competent jury."
While probably the weight of authority, taking all classes of
cases together, is in favor of the principal case, and it has "con-
venience" on its side, it is believed that the strict rule as applied to
capital cases, when the defendant has not been negligent, and has
not learned of the positive statutory disqualification of a juror
until after verdict, has reason and justice in its favor, and is sup-
ported by creditable authority.
LIABILITY OF INSURER WHEN INSURED IS EXECUTED FOR A CRIME.
The authorities are not uniform as to the liability of the insurer
in the event of the death of the insured in consequence of the
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known violation of the law when the life insurance policy contains.
no clause exempting the insurer from such liability. Vance oi
Insurance, Sec. 2oo, states that "Most policies of insurance contain
a clause exempting the insurer from liability for the death of the
insured in consequence of the known violation of the law or at the
hands of justice." Of course, no question arises when the policy
contains such a clause.
In the recent case of Northwestern Ins. Co. v. M1IcCiue, 223 U.
S., 234, the life insurance policy did not contain any clause
exempting the company from liability under such circumstances,
and it was held that death at the hands of the law in execution of
a conviction and sentence for murder was not covered by a policy
of life insurance, though such manner of death was not excepted
from the policy, there being no question of the justice of the sen-
tence.
The decision in the principal case is in accordance with the
judgment rend~red in Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 187
U. S., 362. The decision of the Federal Court was not based
upon the theory that the question as to the guilt of insured was.
res adjudicata, but said that to hold otherwise would be against
public policy. The Court in construing the contract states that
the policy did not insure against his legal execution, and if death
was the result of a legal execution, then the condition in the policy
of natural death, upon which it was to become payable, had not
occurred. The Alabama Court in Supreme Commandery K. of'
G. v. Ailsworth, 71 Ala., 436, declared that risk is the material
element of the contract of life insurance, and that "it cannot be in
the contemplation of the parties that the assured by his own crim-
inal act shall deprive the contract of its material element; shall
vary and enlarge the risk, and hasten the day of payment of the
insurance money." Accordingly in that case suicide was implied
as an exception to the liability of the insurer. Upon the same
ground of reasoning, McKenna, J., delivering the opinion in the-
principal case, said that the interest of the insured in the com-
pany was fixed by the amount of his insurance. Continuing the-
argument the learned judge observed, "But what constitutes his.
title or right? Necessarily his policy. What entitles him to a
realization of the benefits of his membership? Necessarily, again,.
his policy, if the manner of his death be not a violation of it."
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The English court in Amicable Society v. Bolland, decided by
the House of Lords in 183 o , and reported in 4 Bligh's N. R. 194,
enunciates the doctrine laid down in the principal case. In that
case one Fountleroy insured his life with the Amicable Insurance
Society and soon afterwards committed a forgery on the Bank of
England. For nine years he continued to pay the premiums, but
was finally apprehended and declared a bankrupt, respondents
being his assignees. The question presented to the Court was
whether the assignees could recover under the circumstances. The
Court declared that no liability rested upon the insurer. The
Lord Chancellor said that if the policy itself had stated "that in
the event of his committing a capital felony, and being tried, con-
victed and executed for that felony, the assignees shall receive a
certain sum of money," such stipulation would be absolutely void
-upon "the plainest principles of public policy." Such a provision,
if valid, would encourage crime and remove a restraint which
continually operates upon the minds of persons who contemplate
crime. Where an express provision of this description would be
void the Court will not by implication read into the contract a stip-
ulation which is contrary to public policy. "Death at the hands
of public justice works a forfeiture of all right to indemnity under
a policy, whether it does or does not contain such stipulation."
May on Insurance, Sec. 326.
In the case of Bix v. Lanier, 112 Tenn., 393, the liability of the
insurer was not involved. The question was as to who would be
entitled to the insurance money after it was paid over by the
insurer. In this case the husband insured his life, making his
wife beneficiary under his policy in case she should survive him.
He killed his wife and then committed suicide. The administra-
tors of the husband and the administrators of the wife both
claimed the insurance money. The Court held that the incapacity
of a man's administrators to receive the proceeds of a policy on
his life which had been assigned to his wife, because he wilfully
took her life, does not cause their escheat to the state, but they
will pass to her distributees as if the husband had never been in
existence. The Court states, "The property never vested in the
husband. Therefore he had nothing to forfeit. It is clearly not
in conflict with that section of the Constitution which states that
no convicion shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of
estate."
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But the Illinois Court in Collins v, Metropolitan Life Ins, Co.,
232 IMi., 37, after a careful consideration of the 'opinion in Amir-
able Society v. Bolland, supra, declared that it was no defense to
an action on a policy of life insurance that the accused was
executed after a conviction for crime unless the policy contained
a provision relieving the company in express terms from liability
under the contract in case of such contingency, Vickers, J,,
delivering the opinion of the Court, observed that at the time
Amicable Society v. Bolland was decided the doctrine of forfeit=
ure was still in operation in England, However, the Lord Chan-
cellor in that case made no reference to the doctrine of forfeiture
for conviction of felony, but based his entire opinion upon the
grounds of public policy. From the Constitution of Illinois
Vickers, J., in Collins v. Metropolitan Life Ins, Co,, supra, quoted
the following section: "All penalties shall be apportioned to the
nature of the offense, and no conviction shall work corruption of
blood or forfeiture of estate." "If," continued the learned judge,
"a man who is executed for crime has at his death $iooo in real
estate, $i,ooo in chattels and $i,ooo in life insurance payable to
his estate, his real estate descended to his heirs, and his personal
estate to his administrators, but the $i,ooo life insurance must be
left in the hands of the company who has received the premiums,
because it is said to be contrary to public policy to require the
company to pay, lest by doing so it lend encouragement to other
policy-holders to seek murder, and execution therefor, in order
that their estates or heirs might profit thereby. We know of no
rule of public policy in this .state which will enforce this species
of forfeiture." It was held further that the insured bad com-
plied with all the contractual obligations since premiums had been
promptly paid, and that justice required the insurance company
to fulfill its obligations by paying over the money to the proper
beneficiaries. It is evident that the Illinois Court considered the
doctrine of forfeitures the true doctrine upon which the English
Court in Amicable Society v. Bolland reached its conclusion,
A further exception to the foregoing doctrines is stated -n Lang
v. Ins. Co., iio N. W. (Nebr.), iio, where it is stated that
suicide will not defeat a recovery upon a contract of insurance
not procured by the insured with the intention of committing
suicide, unless the contract so provides in express terms. But if
it was procured with such intent it is a fraud on the insurer and
will defeat a recovery.
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"Where death at the hands of justice is not expressly excepted
in the policy the vested rights of third parties, innocent bene-
ficiaries, designated as payees, would seem to be left undisturbed
by the legal sentence and execution of the insured for crime, many
courts considering that any question of public policy on- the one
side is more than offset by the injustice of depriving innocent sur-
vivors of their natural means of subsistence, and of leaving with
tbhe insurance 'company both the premiums and the insurance
money." Richards on Insurance, 521.
The general weight of authority, however, would appear to be
in accord with the rule adopted by the Federal Court in the prin-
cipal case, that death at the hands of justice or by suicide is not
a risk which has been assumed by the insurer, and that the insurer
is relieved of all liability to any class of beneficiaries, although the
policy contains no express provision exempting the insurer from
liability.
